NGOs working across borders face increased accountability demands. While many have proposed ways of changing accountability practices, the debate is rarely informed by leaders' perspectives of how accountability is perceived and practiced across different organizational settings. In interviews with NGO leaders we find aspirations to make accountability more meaningful and integrated, in particular by listening more to stakeholders other than donors. But these aspirations are rarely put in practice and leaders continue to highlight traditional means such as financial accounting. This gap is particularly pronounced for smaller organizations and reflects an increasingly competitive environment shaped by rating agencies and a focus on financial metrics. In order to move from aspirations to practice, NGOs have to be willing to share more meaningful information about their work and outcomes with stakeholders. Practicing transparency that empowers beneficiaries is central to effective organizational learning and balancing demands from different stakeholders.
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The accountability of transnational non-governmental organizations (TNGOs) has become a major topic of academic and policy debate (Brown, 2008; Ebrahim & Weisband, 2007; Jordan & van Tuijl, 2006; Rubenstein, 2007; Steffek & Hahn, 2010) . With the increasing visibility of non-state actors in global affairs, demands for greater responsiveness and better measures of actual impact have increased. NGOs with transnational activities face particularly complex accountability challenges because they regularly invoke universal values while operating across diverse cultural contexts, cross vast economic disparities in channeling donor money to the poor and marginalized, and often use "accountability politics" (Keck & Sikkink, 1998: 24) in their mobilization for social and political change. As a result, NGOs' own accountability practices face particular scrutiny.
A number of initiatives and self-appointed watchdogs, including Charity Navigator, Guidestar, or the Better Business Bureau, offer primarily efficiency-based information designed to address the accountability gap and these ratings have been shown to affect contributions in a significant manner (Gordon, Knock & Neely, 2009; Sloan, 2009 ). External and independent efforts to hold US-based NGOs more accountable have for a long time primarily relied on financial data contained in IRS 990 forms to measure overhead ratios and fundraising success as a proxy for an effective organization. But framing accountability primarily in terms of financial efficiency enhances 'upward' accountability towards donors, disadvantages smaller and more advocacy-oriented organizations (Goggins Gregory & Howard, 2009; Wing & Hager, 2004) , and provides no insights into the actual impact of an organization and its programs (Schmitz & Mitchell, 2009) . Scholars have for some time argued that increased reporting requirements will come "at the expense of attention to longer-term processes of organizational learning" (Ebrahim, 2005: 81) . While many of these watchdogs have recently promised to deemphasize overhead ratios and develop more comprehensive measures of impact (Charity Navigator, et al., 2009 ), many challenges with regard to assessing and enhancing impact and balancing demands towards NGOs remain.
As an alternative to external watchdogs, NGOs and nonprofits may create their own voluntary "accountability clubs" (Gugerty & Prakash, 2010b) which are designed to assure potential donors of the members' legitimacy. Such clubs typically establish guidelines above and beyond what is legally required and offer reputational benefits in exchange for fulfilling the stated policies of the club (Gugerty & Prakash, 2010a: 17) . Such voluntary accountability clubs vary with regard to the standards imposed and the degree of monitoring as well as enforcement.
Examples include the INGO Accountability Charter, which offers cross-sectoral accreditation in cooperation with the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP), which focuses exclusively on accountability during disaster relief, or AccountAbility, which offers its services not only to non-profits, but also corporations and governments. Leaders of nonprofits are faced with an increasing plethora of such initiatives, services, and clubs, and have to choose which might be most appropriate for their own situation and needs.
While much of the scholarly and policy literature on NGO accountability focuses on why this issue has risen to prominence and prescribes appropriate responses and models, we lack leadership and cross-sectoral perspectives on the core questions of what we call here the what for, to whom, and how of being accountable in the transnational NGO sector. We argue that having a baseline understanding of how leaders of transnational NGOs think about accountability issues offers for the first time a systematic empirical test of widespread assumptions about dominant donor influence and a struggle to elevate the role of beneficiaries in decision-making.
The results of this study also add to the current literature and specialized initiatives a better understanding of the obstacles faced by transnational NGOs which, in turn, help develop concrete steps towards changed accountability practices.
Following a brief background section on recent accountability debates, the main empirical sections provide a systematic description of leadership views on what accountability is, to whom NGO leaders feel they are accountable to and how they implement accountability in their organization. We confirm the gap between the advances in the scholarship and specialized initiatives on accountability and the perceptions and practices within individual organizations.
With few exceptions, NGO leaders highlight donor expectations and financial accounting as central to their current accountability practices, while broader understandings of accountability involving stakeholder participation in decision-making remain rare. While specialized initiatives have tried for years to redefine for what purposes accountability should be used, increased pressure for financial disclosure and efficiency has limited the ability of NGOs to redefine the role of accountability within their organizations. Second, we find that TNGO leaders aspire to a broader view of accountability which is more in line with specialized initiatives and the scholarly literature (Ebrahim, 2005; Kearns, 1996; Unerman & O'Dwyer, 2006) . Answers indicate a desire to listen to a wider set of stakeholders, especially emphasizing 'downward' mechanisms of involving the beneficiaries of NGO activities (Kilby, 2006; Slim, 2002) . However, we find that these aspirations are not yet matched by practices that would signal a more lasting shift in how NGOs practice accountability. To do so, NGOs have become much more proactive in sharing information about program outcomes, not just outputs, and make the involvement of beneficiaries central to the what they want to be held accountable to by donors and other stakeholders.
Why Debating NGO Accountability?
The expansion of the global non-profit sector following a shift of donor money away from governments to NGOs during the 1980s and 1990s (Agg, 2006) First, an increasingly crowded marketplace creates incentives for individual organizations to distinguish themselves using positive ratings of external watchdogs or certification systems.
While many leaders of these organizations reject the methodology of Charity Navigator and others, displaying a 4-star rating on websites and fundraising materials offers a quick and lowcost solution to the accountability challenge.
A second reason for more demands on accountability has less to do with the growth of the sector, but with the inherent expansion of the mandates NGOs across all major sectors of transnational activism have taken on in the past decades. These mandates have either expanded as a result of the significant growth of an individual organization or changes in the interpretation of their mandate and strategies. Many traditional service-oriented organizations have added explicit advocacy strategies to their portfolio (Lindenberg & Bryant, 2001) and make now more explicit efforts to address what they perceive as the root causes of poverty. The proliferation of a rights-based approach (RBA) to their development interventions requires these organizations to think more seriously about the sustainability of social and political change and ways in which local populations can meaningfully participate in the decision-making of an organization.
Related to the question of what it means to actually make a difference is a third pressure primarily visible in the United States context of philanthropic giving. With the emergence of a more 'entrepreneurial' philanthropy (Edwards, 2008; Schervish, 2005) , demands for a specific kind of accountability understood as an emphasis on measurable outcomes has increased.
A fourth reason for increasing accountability demands towards NGOs relates to the key strategies used by many transnational advocacy groups using "accountability politics" (Keck & Sikkink, 1998) in their efforts to change the behavior of governments, corporations, and others.
Advocacy organizations emerging in the 1960s and 1970s developed and perfected strategies of 'naming and shaming' to mobilize against human rights abuses and environmental destruction, and some of the same strategies have been effectively used to challenge their own legitimacy. This is particularly important in the context of transnational campaigns and service delivery, where transnational activists do not necessarily understand the needs of local communities (Hertel, 2006) and developing common goals and strategies requires sustained interactions across powerful cultural and economic barriers. Quoting Michael Edwards, Zadek (2003, p. 35) summarizes that "the challenge for NGOs is to show they can put into practice the [accountability] principles they campaign for in others" (see also : Edwards, 2000; Naidoo, 2004; Zadek, 2003: 35) .
From an NGO leadership perspective, what should be most worrisome about these new pressures in the context of extensive (but unequal) growth of resources is that they can create mutually exclusive and incoherent demands on an organization. For example, the philanthropic giving based on a set of rigorous outcome measurements may be incompatible with efforts to strengthen 'downward' accountability. If demands for performance as well as competition increase, organizations will be less likely to take the risk of acknowledging failures as a part of a redefined accountability practice focused on learning. In subsequent sections, we contrast the literature on accountability with views expressed by leaders of transnational NGOs. In particular, we look for how these leaders define accountability, to whom they feel accountable to, and how they implement accountability.
A Leadership View on Accountability
In this section, we first briefly explain the methodological underpinnings of the interview study and then present data from 152 semi-structured interviews conducted between 2006 and
2008.

Background Study and Data
From a population of roughly 3,500 not-for-profit organizations in the Charity Navigator database as of 2005, 334 NGOs had both transnational activities and complete financial information. Organizations were selected based on three organizational attributes: sector, size, and fiscal health. At the time the sample was drawn, Charity Navigator was the only source allowing for cross-sectoral sampling based on financial metrics. From this population, we interviewed 152 leaders. 81% were CEOs of these organizations. A multidisciplinary team of investigators produced the interview protocol, conducted the interviews, and manually coded the transcripts using the qualitative software Atlas.ti.
1 For purposes of readability, the interview quotes used here were edited without changing their meaning. Anonymized versions of the originals can be made available from the transcripts populating the Atlas.ti database.
[ INSERT TABLE 1] The 152 transnational NGOs in the sample fall into five core sectors of activity: peace and conflict resolution (8.6%), human rights (13.8%), environmental protection (14.5%), humanitarian relief (21.1%), and development services (42.1%). The categories were chosen based on distinctions used by Charity Navigator as well as a survey of the academic literature which revealed that most research focuses exclusively on one of the five sectors identified. We categorized almost half of the organizations as primarily concerned with service delivery (46.1%) and 22.3% as advocacy-oriented. The remaining 31.6% were categorized as engaging in both activities.
[INSERT TABLE 2]
Fiscal efficiency and organizational capacity are categories derived from Charity Navigator's methodology. While fiscal efficiency measures weigh program expenses against spending on administration and fundraising, organizational capacity is measured based on the growth of the organization over time. Using those two categories, CN then awards up to a fourstar rating to individual organizations. Table 2 shows that 54% of organizations in the sample received high scores with regard to efficiency and capacity, while only 14.5% received low scores in both areas. 77% of the organizations in our sample were rated high in terms of efficiency, which may include many "charities that know how to play the game through clever and deceitful accounting practices" (Gordon, et al., 2009: 482) . As a result, we are skeptical of the value of these ratings and efficiency measures and have used them in the study only to establish the sample.
[ INSERT TABLE 3] A third important sampling category used was size of the organization. In order to measure organizational size, we used the budget numbers for 2004. The variable size was coded along three categories: small (less than $1 million), medium ($1 million to $10 million) and large (greater than $10 million). While our three categories fail to sufficiently separate out very large NGOs, 2 our main goal at the time of sampling was to ensure that we have a sufficient number of smaller organizations included in the study. Our goal was to correct for some of the biases in the literature on transnational NGOs which tends to focus largely on a few high-profile activist organizations. At the time the sampling was done, very few large organizations (with an annual budget larger than $250 million) were present in the population of TNGOs available in the Charity Navigator database. Table 3 indicates that 79% of the organizations in the study are either small (36.8%) or mid-sized (42.1%). Therefore, the categorization for organizational size we chose allowed us to represent the spread of smaller organizations present in the population at the time. A limitation of this study is the reliance on accountability perceptions of leaders only.
Such perceptions are likely to be different at other levels of the organization, but it is precisely the role of leaders to make key decisions about balancing different stakeholder demands.
Understanding how leaders think about accountability challenges provides the most representative perspective for the organization overall. Face-to-face interviews present specific challenges, including possible distorting effects due to the interview situation or respondent bias and a desire to withhold information. We developed several mechanisms to ensure data quality, including assuring full anonymity and asking interviewers to complete debriefing forms in which they assessed candor of responses. Finally, since we used the Charity Navigator Database for sampling, the results are limited to U.S.-registered TNGOs and cannot necessarily be generalized beyond that context.
What is Accountability?
Leaders were asked an open-ended question about accountability: Another governance issue for NGOs seems to be accountability. How does your organization define "accountability"? (TNGO Initiative Protocol, section 2.4). Rather than matching the answers to scholarly concepts, we took a more inductive approach and classified answers under key themes emerging from the transcripts. We found that most answers to the definitional question immediately established a relational understanding of accountability by referring to one of the organization's stakeholders.
[ INSERT TABLE 4] References to financial management were most frequent in the answers (63.8%), usually along with an explicit mention of donors:
"(….) [Accountability] is just having good governance and good management that protects [and] really treats the donors funding as an investment on their part. And that's the view we really try to take" (Interview 10, para. 1743).
Second to financial management are references to the mandate or mission of the organization (46.1%). A typical response reads as follows: "Accountable to the work we said we would do and [in] the way in which we said we would do it to the communities" (Interview 117, para. 250). Another example in this category reads: "In the public sphere, I take accountability to mean making sure you get it right, because (…) it overlaps with credibility basically" (Interview 27, para. 155). While this respondent refers to 'getting it right' and to implicitly accomplishing a mission, the answer also reveals an understanding that fulfilling the mandate is what gives credibility to an organization. This type of "outcome accountability" (Kearns, 1996: 30) is not incompatible with a donor focus, but it emphasizes the impact of an organization, not how well it responds to donor demands.
A close third of prevalent terms associated with defining accountability is transparency (Interview 46, para. 686). As this answer indicates, transparency is frequently linked to financial disclosure, but it could also point beyond it and involve more complex notions of accountability.
Some respondents view the disclosure of decision-making mechanisms and processes, governance structures or the availability of information about the organization to the general public as an important part of organizational accountability:
"(…) we make a lot of information public, not just that which is required by the IRS, the front pages of a 990, but we are quite, quite liberal with what we will do, and (…) you can tell from my answers, I am willing to tell you just about anything about the organization because there is really nothing here to hide, you know?" (Interview 9, para. 310). We find that leaders view transparency and disclosure as an important part of integrity, but the latter term refers to a much broader understanding of legitimate behavior which includes living up to the principles of the organizations and communicating truthfully. Scholars have previously explored the differences between answerability and transparency, largely agreeing that disclosure is only a first step towards more meaningful accountability (Goetz & Jenkins, 2002: 5; Weisband & Ebrahim, 2007) . Disseminated information only qualifies as "clear" transparency if it allows interested parties "to pursue strategies of constructive change" (Fox, 2007: 667) .
While the aspiration to be not just transparent in a narrow sense is clearly visible in the interviews, the answers remain ambiguous with regard the how far organizations have gone in moving from simple forms of disclosure to a more complex understanding of integrity which includes involving constituents in the process of defining legitimate actions. Some of the answers suggest that integrity is closely related to mandate and mission, emphasizing that the organization needs to live up to the values it set out for itself.
" […] well, accountability takes many forms. We have a system and values within the organization with integrity. Integrity beyond reproach as a matter of fact, being, the first and foremost in that (…)." (Interview 14, para. 441).
Only a few interviews explicitly linked accountability to organizational learning. Being open to change and learning has become a compelling theme in the scholarly debate on NGO accountability (Ebrahim, 2005) , but is rarely mentioned by TNGO leaders. One respondent expressed a sense of accountability as learning when arguing that it means "being also open to change and suggestions when things aren't going appropriately. Being accountable for actions, taking responsibility I guess would be a good way of putting it" (Interview 57, para. 612).
[INSERT These results show that donor-driven accountability pressures are particularly pronounced for smaller organizations, while larger organizations report more diffuse demands. Hence, we provide not only empirical confirmation to widespread claims about the dominance of upward accountability (Ebrahim, 2003 ), but we show that these concerns are particularly prevalent among the majority of organizations with smaller budgets.
In sum, answers to the question of how to define accountability are dominated by references to concrete practices that are largely reactive to external demands. Three of the top four mentions refer to financial management, transparency, and legal obligations. These results are particularly strong for smaller organizations, while mentions of the mandate as a key content of accountability increase with size. None of these results indicate a surge for new accountability practices with greater emphasis on beneficiaries or show a concern for prioritizing among competing demands. Instead, the answers confirm the claims stated in our earlier review of the current accountability debate, specifically that transnational NGOs are exposed to increasing external demands for a specific type of accountability which puts emphasis on accounting practices and donors and likely undermines moving towards a more complex and beneficiarydriven definitions of accountability (Jordan, 2007: 153 The overall accountability prioritization emerging from the data (Figure 1) shows a more optimistic picture than a recent global survey of 600 NGOs conducted by a team of researchers at the University of Warwick (Scholte, 2005 ). An assembly of donors, board, but also beneficiaries leads in terms of salience among TNGO leaders, followed by partner organizations, 4 host/charter governments and staff in second place, and members, 5 mission/mandate and the general public in third place.
[
INSERT FIGURE 1]
This ordering reflects the leaders' perception of how important the ties to different stakeholders are, primarily as it relates to funding (donors), governance (board), and programs (beneficiaries). 6 In the context of the interviews, it is apparent that TNGO leaders have aspirations to strengthen downward accountability, but perceive of it as not necessarily directly related to satisfying demands by donors. In this quote, a leader continues after having confirmed accountability to donors first:
"[…] I think as an organization, we feel very much accountable to the partners we work with as a field and to the women whose lives we're trying to impact. And so getting completely out of the head of finance and administration side of things and into the moral side of things, I think as an organization, we have very clear values.
We are a mission driven organization and our mission is to empower women and end poverty. So I think we feel a very strong sense of accountability to do right in the world by those values" (Interview 30, para.423).
A key result of this section is the strong link between being accountable to donors and a definition of accountability as being focused on financial management, transparency, and legal as little evidence of explicit references to how leaders would shift accountability priorities and implement alternative approaches to accountability. In a final step to complete our understanding of leadership perspectives, we then asked leaders about how they implement accountability in daily practices.
Accountable How?
In order to assess the implementation of accountability measures we asked: What strategies or activities does your organization use to strengthen its accountability? (TNGO Initiative Protocol, section 2.4). Respondents described the strategies and processes they implemented in their organizations to foster accountability. Table 9 reflects differences in salience of the various tools used by organizations in the sample.
[ INSERT TABLE 9] Respondents most frequently mentioned audits as a means of implementing accountability (55.9%). They describe two main types of auditing: external audits, conducted by independent auditors, or internal auditing systems conducted by assigned teams or departments.
The primary goal for external audits is to obtain an independent evaluation of the organization and its programs (Interview 18, para. 305). Others highlight in what ways such audits are a tool in projecting accountability to external audiences. "I just switched auditors because I didn't think our auditors were doing a good job making us transparent and that we could do better. So that, that was a step [toward improving accountability practices]" (Interview 1, para. 698).
Other respondents describe the auditing process as internal to the organization by conducting regular visits to the various project sites and developing standard terms of reference Respondents frequently emphasize the need to have reports from each project that include financial details (Interview 83, para. 167). We do not find significant differences in the dominance of audits across sectors and size.
Following the dominant practices of audits and evaluation, a cluster of four practices includes references to standing policies, public disclosure, reports to the board, and consultations. Except for 'consultations,' all of the most salient practices mentioned point towards a limited and primarily passive practice of implementing accountability. By being passive, leaders are more likely to respond to the traditional constituents, board and donors, while missing out on opportunities to give other stakeholders, such as beneficiaries, a greater voice. The dominant means of being accountable focus either on donor accountability or on narrowly defined disclosure strategies which give organization significant discretion in what kind of information is made available. Furthermore, while respondents put some emphasis on beneficiaries as stakeholders, the practices they describe in their organizations are not reflective of this prioritization. They might aim for more downward accountability, but in practical terms, they remain stuck in practices more reflective of accounting, disclosure, and 'upward' response.
Our results confirm earlier surveys of NGO practices which have found some evidence for alternative approaches among nonprofits, but also showed that only very few have actually adopted those practices as routine (Benjamin, 2008; BOND, 2006) .
Conclusions
Interviews with leaders of transnational NGOs offer insights resonating with ongoing scholarly debates about accountability. Following a summary of the results, we will focus in the conclusions on how this survey of leadership perspectives affects both the practice and the study of NGO accountability. While the study was not designed to introduce major new conceptual or theoretical ideas about accountability, the leadership views offer important lessons and feedback on the ongoing debates about how NGOs should navigate increasing accountability demands from a growing set of stakeholders.
This study confirms that ideas about downward accountability have diffused from special initiatives and the academic literature to the leaders of transnational NGOs. While there is strong evidence for the spread of this normative shift, more detailed questioning on actual accountability practices reveals a gap between the rhetorical commitment to downward accountability and a persistent emphasis on financial accounting and donors. Beneficiaries are frequently identified as important constituents; however, accountability practices rarely include mechanisms to make such voices heard. In addition, the interviews show that this gap is more pronounced among the majority of smaller organizations, while larger NGOs are more likely to report the adoption of innovative accountability practices. While scholars have identified regular interactions with about six stakeholder groups, the leaders interviewed for this study only mentioned an average of three such constituents. This suggests a need for greater attention to accountability practices differentiated by the type of stakeholder identified as well as a developing guidance regarding the relative importance and prioritization of stakeholder demands.
Leaders are aware of the challenges associated with strengthening accountability practices in the context of an increasingly diverse stakeholder pool with possibly conflicting
demands. An effective response to these challenges requires addressing three specific hurdles we found in the interviews, including (1) the emphasis on efficiency imposed by charity watchdogs and some donors, (2) institutional inertia preventing the important changes to accountability practices, and (3) the costs involved in tracking the impact of organizational activities.
These challenges can be met by increased efforts to proactively engage with constituents as well as strengthening collective action in dealing with institutional donors and rating agencies.
Organizations can avoid tensions between beneficiary and donor demands by collecting and interactive Web-based technologies as key to increasing stakeholder involvement, but has also found "severe underutilization of the technology" (Saxton & Guo, 2009: 19) .
Changing accountability practices towards external stakeholders will also have important Tables   Table 1. Overview of the Sample by Sector of Activity and Main Function 
